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Abstract—Cognitive radio networks sense spectrum occupancy
and manage themselves to operate in unused bands without
disturbing licensed users. Spectrum sensing is more accurate
if jointly performed by several reliable nodes. Even though
cooperative sensing is an active area of research, the secure
authentication of local sensing reports remains unsolved, thus
empowering false results. This paper presents a distributed
protocol based on digital signatures and hash functions, and an
analysis of its security features. The system allows determining
a final sensing decision from multiple sources in a quick and
secure way.
Index Terms—authentication, cognitive radio, cooperative sens-
ing, cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum is an essential resource for the provision of mobile
services. In order to control and delimit its use, governmen-
tal agencies set up regulatory policies. Unfortunately, such
policies have led to a deficiency of spectrum as only few
frequency bands are left unlicensed, and these are used for
the majority of new emerging wireless applications. Besides,
studies conducted by the Spectrum Policy Task Force show
that most of the licensed spectrum is largely under-utilized
[1].
One promising way to alleviate the spectrum shortage
problem is adopting a spectrum sharing paradigm in which
frequency bands are used opportunistically. In this scheme,
those who own the license to use the spectrum are referred
to as primary users, and those who access the spectrum
opportunistically are referred to as secondary users. Secondary
users must not interfere with primary ones, who always have
usage priority.
The enabling technology for opportunistic sharing is cogni-
tive radio (CR) [2]. A CR is a system that senses its electro-
magnetic environment and can dynamically and autonomously
adjust its operating parameters to access the spectrum. CR
terminals form self-organizing networks capable to detect
vacant spectrum bands that can be used without harmful
interference with primary users. Once a vacant band is found,
secondary users coordinate themselves in order to share the
available spectrum.
Performing reliable spectrum sensing is a difficult task.
Wireless channels can suffer fading, thus provoking the hidden
node problem in which a secondary user fails to detect a
primary transmitter. The most important challenge for a CR
is to identify the presence of primary users, and, for this
reason, secondary users must be significantly more sensitive
in detecting primary transmissions than primary receivers.
In order to reduce the sensitivity requirements of individual
CRs, recent studies propose performing distributed spectrum
sensing (DSS)[3]. In DSS, multiple secondary users cooperate
and share their local sensing results, which are then merged
together to reach a final decision. Although the use of cooper-
ation in spectrum sensing has been extensively studied, some
security issues still remain unsolved.
The problem of current spectrum sensing protocols is
that they do not provide any mechanism to authenticate the
observations exchanged by secondary users. This problem
is present even in those protocols that intend to deal with
malicious users. Secure spectrum sensing protocols assume
that sensing reports from secondary users can be effectively
authenticated. As a result, malicious users can be detected -
their reports repeatedly differ from the final decision- and their
contributions discarded. However, a mechanism to authenticate
the observations sent by secondary users is still missing.
This paper presents a protocol that enables the secure
authentication of sensing information. The protocol is mainly
based on the use of hash functions, so that authentication
is carried out as quickly as possible. Performing spectrum
sensing without significant delay is essential because a lengthy
sensing process reduces the time left for transmission. Further-
more, a lengthy sensing process will certainly consume more
energy at the CR. Thus, the combination of the proposed pro-
tocol with the existing data fusion schemes allows distributed
spectrum sensing to be conducted effectively.
II. BACKGROUND
Cooperative sensing is based on merging the local obser-
vations of multiple secondary users. Traditionally, there are
two techniques which are used for local spectrum sensing:
energy detection or cyclostationary feature detection. Energy
detection is based on integrating the energy received over an
observation interval. This method is optimal when secondary
users do not have sufficient information about the primary user
signal. On the other hand, cyclostationary feature detection
takes advantage of the fact that signals used in wireless
communications are cyclostationary. Thus, their features can
be detected using a spectral correlation function. However this
method requires longer observation times.
Since local spectrum sensing results are subject to multi-
path and/or shadowing fading, the cooperation among CRs is
fundamental to achieve a reliable decision. This cooperation
can be implemented in a centralized or distributed manner. In
the centralized method, the base station or fusion center (FC)
gathers all the information from secondary users and executes
the data fusion to reach the final decision. On the other hand,
distributed solutions require all secondary users to exchange
their local observations, so that the data fusion operation is
carried out independently on each secondary device.
Several data fusion schemes have been proposed to merge
the sensing data observed by each secondary user. These
schemes are based on exchanging of more or less infor-
mation depending on whether devices perform hard or soft
cooperation. When hard cooperation is employed, radios only
exchange their final decision: primary user detected or not
detected. On the other hand, soft cooperation means that radios
exchange their local test statistics with each other. Among the
proposed methods, the most typical one is based on applying
the “k out of N” rule. This rule determines that the channel is
occupied if at least k of the N secondary users have detected
the primary signal. As avoiding interference with primary
users is a top priority, the most common value of k is 1.
Other methods proposed for merging the sensing data are
based on modeling the fusion process as a probabilistic prob-
lem. Zarrin and Lim [4] compute the probability of detection
by performing the likelihood ratio test (LRT), which is based
on the Neyman-Pearson theorem and is used for optimal
decision making. Wang et al. [5] apply another probabilistic
method where secondary users are classified according to
their SNR level and those with higher levels are given more
influence on the final decision. Alternatively, Chen et al. [6]
propose the use of a Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT).
SPRT is a data fusion scheme that supports a variable number
of local spectrum sensing results. The protocol assumes that
the number of sensing results can be increased and adjusted
as necessary, so it guarantees both a bounded false alarm
probability and a bounded miss detection probability. The
authors also suggest the use of a reputation-based scheme to
increase the robustness of the data fusion process.
The introduction of reputation mechanisms in the sensing
process has also been considered in some studies. In [7], a
two-step protocol for the detection of malicious users that
report false sensing data is proposed. In the first step, an outlier
detection method is applied to pre-filter those sensing results
that are too distant from the rest of the data. In the second
step, each user is associated with a trust factor that is based
on the past and present sensing data sent by the user. Thus, the
trust factor lends more or less weight to a decision depending
on the reliability of the corresponding user.
Another important issue to take into account when perform-
ing spectrum sensing is preventing primary user emulation
attacks. These attacks allow a malicious secondary user to
gain priority over others by emulating the signal of a primary
user. Solutions to this problem are based on checking whether
the estimated location of the transmitter and its signal charac-
teristics match the ones of the licensed primary user [8].
As we have shown, several studies have approached the
problem of providing security and reliability to the spectrum
sensing process. However, no proposal has been presented so
far to authenticate the sensing data provided by a secondary
user. Without such authentication, the proposals based on
associating a reputation or a probability of detection to each
user become useless. The combination of existing protocols
with a secure authentication method can undoubtedly improve
the performance of spectrum sensing protocols in the presence
of faulty radios or malicious users.
III. PROTOCOL
This section presents our protocol for the secure authenti-
cation of users’ sensing reports. The protocol prevents users
from illegitimately claiming false identities and from injecting
fake sensing data. Thus, the protocol aims at withstanding the
following attacks:
• Altering the final sensing decision. A user could incre-
ment her weight in the data fusion process by forging
several identities and making a contribution for each of
them. With enough forged identities, a user might be able
to completely alter the aggregate reading.
• Deceiving the reputation system. By using a different
identity each time, a user might report false sensing data
repeatedly and avoid earning a bad reputation.
• Obtaining resources unfairly. A user could use many
identities to obtain more than her fair share of resources
(e.g. bandwidth).
The proposed protocol assumes that the cooperation among
CR’s is implemented in a centralized manner, which is the
most frequently used configuration in the spectrum sensing
protocols presented to date. We also assume that the secondary
users and the fusion center can use a common control channel.
To perform distributed sensing securely, the cooperative
system should identify the users that participate in the sensing
process, authenticate their claims, and weigh up their con-
tribution to the final decision based on their reputation or
probability of successful detection. Our protocol focuses on
the mechanisms required to identify the users and authenticate
their sensing results. The final part of the distributed sensing
process (i.e. weighing up and merging the contributions) can
be implemented using any of the mechanisms that we have
mentioned in the previous section. The selection of which data
fusion technique to use is out of the scope of this paper.
One of the key goals of the protocol design has been to
develop a quick authentication process. We take a public
key infrastructure (PKI) approach to identify the peers of the
network through digital signatures. Even though this process
is costly, it has to be executed only once, in the setup phase.
Then, we make use of efficient Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) functions to protect users’ sensing reports from
forgery and manipulation.
HMAC functions provide message authenticity and integrity
by calculating a hash of two inputs: the target message and a
secret key. In our protocol, we use hash chains to produce one
time secret keys. Hash Chains, first proposed by Lamport [9],
are versatile low-cost constructions that are used extensively
in various cryptographic systems.
The proposed protocol is divided in two phases. The first
phase is the identification of users, and the second one is the
collection of sensing results. In the following sections, we will
describe each one of these phases in detail.
A. Phase 1: user authentication
In the first phase, the user contacts the fusion center (which
can be, for instance, the base station) and asks permission
to join the cognitive radio network. Besides, she commits
to a hash chain by attaching the top value of the chain in
the request. This process requires mutual authentication using
digital signatures. At this point, the fusion center decides
whether or not to accept the user into the network. The
following are the detailed steps carried out during this phase.
1) User U chooses a random number wN and prepares a
hash chain of length N , where N is chosen by the fusion
center and it is shared by all network members.
Hash chains are composed of a sequence of values that
can only be computed in one-way. A hash chain of
length N is constructed by applying a one-way hash
function H(.) recursively to an initial seed value wN :
wN−1 = H(wN ), wN−2 = H(wN−1), · · ·, w0 =
HN (wN ). In general, wi = H(wi+1) = HN−i(wN ).
2) U sends the top value of her chain (w0) to the fusion
center FC in a digitally signed message. The signature
is computed using U ’s private key pvkU . She also
includes information about her identity IdU (i.e. the
unique identifier of her public key certificate).
JoinReq = {w0, IdU , SignpvkU (w0, IdU )}
3) FC verifies the signature received from U using U ’s
public key pbkU . If the signature is correct, FC decides
whether or not to accept U into the network. This
decision will be based, for example, on the reputation
earned by U in previous processes. The implementation
of these mechanisms is out of the scope of this paper.
B. Phase 2: collection of local sensing results
In the second phase, the fusion center requests each user to
sense a certain set of frequency bands. Users conduct spectrum
sensing using a mechanism based on the energy perceived,
cyclostationary statistics, or any other method. Then, they sign
their own local sensing results with a HMAC function and send
the sensing data and its signature to the fusion center. The keys
used to compute the HMACs are taken from the hash chain,
so that the fusion center can verify the identity of the sender.
The following are the detailed steps carried out in this phase.
1) At time t, FC broadcasts a signed message with a task
list (TaskList) that contains the list of channels each
user has to sense.
SensingReqt = TaskListt, SignpvkB (TaskListt, t)
where
TaskListt = [(Id0, ChannelList0, i0) · · ·
(IdS , ChannelListS , iS)]
In the above expression, S is the total number of
secondary users, and ij is the hash chain index that
points to the value the user j must use in the following
step.
2) Each user U verifies the signature of the sensing re-
quest and, if correct, senses the channels listed in
ChannelListU . After completing the sensing process,
each user sends the results SensingRes to FC. These
results can be binary decisions or long test statistics,
depending on whether hard or soft cooperation is in use.
To allow the authentication of the sensing results, these
are sent as follows:
SignRest = SensingRest,HMAC(SensingRest, wi)
The key used to construct the HMAC is wi, where i is
the index received from FC in SensingReqt.
3) FC waits for the reply of all secondary users and at time
t′ (with t′ = t + ∆ t), it generates a new TaskListt′ .
This new task list can contain empty ChannelLists if
there are not more channels to sense.
SensingReqt′ = TaskListt′ , SignpvkB (TaskListt′)
where
TaskListt′ = [(Id0, ChannelList0, {i + 1}0) · · ·
(IdS , ChannelListS , {i + 1}S)]
4) Each user U verifies the signature of the sensing re-
quest and creates a reply that depends on whether
the corresponding ChannelList is empty or not. If
ChannelList is not empty, then the results are con-
structed as follows:
SignRest′ = SensingRest′ ,
HMAC(SensingRest′ , wi+1), wi
Otherwise, they just contain the key needed to verify the
previous HMAC sent to FC in SignRest.
SignRest′ = wi
As can be seen, the response always includes the key
wi used to create the previous signed results sent in
SignRest.
5) FC waits for the reply of all secondary users and verifies
the HMACs from the SignReqt. If more channels need
to be sensed or more HMACs need to be verified, a new
request is generated. Otherwise, FC starts the fusion of
the sensing results.
IV. DISCUSSION
The presented protocol provides a way to authenticate
sensing reports with a minimum overhead. Each user has
to generate a digital signature when she accesses the fusion
center for the first time. Afterwards, she only has to validate
digital signatures (which is very efficient [10]), and compute
HMAC using a costless hash function. The HMAC keys
can be generated and checked with efficient mechanisms for
fast chain traversal [11], [12] and for economic setup and
verification [13], [14]: a one-way chain with N elements only
requires log(N) storage and log(N) computation to access an
element.
From the security point of view, the proposed system is
robust against Sybil attacks, in which a user illegitimately
claims multiple identities, and the injection of false sensing
reports. Sybil attacks are prevented using certificates generated
by a trusted central authority. If a user does not own a valid
certificate, she is not authorized in the CR network and can
not send sensing reports to the fusion center. On the other
hand, the injection of false sensing reports is avoided using
verifiable HMAC signed reports.
Reporting a verifiable sensing result involves two user
transmissions. First, the user sends the sensing data and its
corresponding HMAC. Then, she reveals the HMAC key,
which is an element of a hash chain. The fusion center verifies
the integrity of the sensing message and the authenticity of the
key.
Sensing reports are protected against modification attacks
since they are signed with an HMAC. Keys used to compute
the HMAC are taken from the secret hash chain w of each
user. Therefore, only the user who created the hash chain can
compute the corresponding HMAC.
Reply attacks are avoided because each HMAC key is used
only once. The fusion center indicates in the sensing request
which element i it has to be used. Chain elements are asked in
ascending order (w0, w1, .. wN ) so knowing a user’s previous
key gives no information about the present one. Moreover, the
sensing request is signed so that an attacker can not modify
the requested hash index.
Additionally, as the sensing requests and replies are syn-
chronized by i, it is not effective to block the user’s reports
in order to steal her keys to later generate fake reports.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified the security vulnerabilities
of a cooperative sensing process and its prejudicial effects
in CR networks. We have proposed a secure protocol for
centralized based systems that uses digital signatures and hash
functions.
The protocol enables the fusion center to verify the identity
of network members and to ensure the received sensing infor-
mation is really originated from the claimed source. One of the
main features of the proposal is the fact that is computationally
efficient and introduces a small bandwidth overhead. As part
of our future research, we plan to integrate reputation measures
into the scheme.
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